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FROM CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE SUPREME
COURT'S FIRST FIFTY YEARS
ALBERT BRODERICKt

INTRODUCTION

I have been attempting to revive an approach to the Constitution that was
given considerable respectability by Justices Jackson and Cardozo-the notion
that the Supreme Court in the portion of its work that we know as constitutional
law is, and has been from the beginning, primarily a "political institution."'
This theme is dear to political scientists, I am told, but it is not popular with
lawyers, who prefer to view a departure by the Court from traditional legal analysis (whatever that may be) as a deviation to be deplored rather than an optimum lawyers' product.
The term "politics thesis" is proposed to identify the project I am encouraging. I shall briefly recap it here, but then hasten to develop my specific theme for
today: the verification of the "politics thesis" in the first fifty years of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution.
Justice Jackson referred to the Court "as a political institution arbitrating
the allocation of powers between different branches of the Federal Government,
between state and nation, between state and state, and between majority government and minority rights."'2 He cited Cardozo's concurrence: " 'It [the New
York Court of Appeals] is a great common law court; its problems are lawyers'
problems. But the Supreme Court is occupied chiefly with statutory construetion-which no man can make interesting-and with politics.' "3
In his still classic The Supreme Court in United States History,4 Charles
Warren time and again repeats that from the beginning the Court has avoided
partisanship in the Federalist-Republican or Republican-Democrat sense. But
in the area of interpretation of the Constitution the Court has rarely made its
basic constitutional choices from the text-legislative history-stare decisis tools of
the workaday lawyer. Even H.L.A. Hart, who emancipated legal positivism
with his secondary "rule of recognition," exempted American constitutional decision-making from his prim methodology.5 I argue here that from the beginning the Supreme Court's first consideration in interpreting the Constitution has
t Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University School of Law. A.B. 1937, Princeton
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been constitutional politics. Only when the politics task has been completed
does the Supreme Court utter constitutional law.
In using the term "politics" here I include the full gamut of "non-law"
elements. One might say that various brands of politics enter into constitutional
"interpretative" choices with one Justice (or Supreme Court) or another, at one
time or another. These include considerations of federalism, of shared federal
powers, of race, sex, fair trial (or fairness generally), of democracy (voting
rights), consensus, stability, moderation or compromise, and a politics of institutional respectability (consistency and coherence). Some commentators (Ronald
Dworkin, Harry Wellington) prefer to call all this "constitutional morality."
But the term "morality" has been much muddied by the Reagan-Meese-Reynolds assault on affirmative action. Like Justices Jackson and Cardozo, I prefer
the term "politics" for the m6lange of non-law factors that the Supreme Court
takes into consideration in guiding a contemporary constitutional polity.
Justice Jackson reminded us that the Supreme Court started its constitutional interpretation with a blank slate.6 There was a certain memory of the
happenings at the 1787 Convention, but there was no legislative history, as such.
Madison's Notes were not published until 1840, and even Elliott's Debates (concerning the state ratifying conventions) did not appear until 1835. When the
Marshall Court made its first major political choice (for judicial review) in Marbury v. Madison7 in 1803, Marshall ignored the "Convention memory" of the
many members of that first Congress which had drafted the memorable section
13 of the Judiciary Act. Marshall's Court simply held that section
unconstitutional.
The politics thesis suggests that there is more value in examining what the
Court has done across constitutional history than in crediting everything it has
said. From John Marshall in Marbury to Owen Roberts in United States v. Butler,8 Justices have professed that the great power of judicial review is tested
simply by putting the words of the Constitution side by side with the words of a
statute and concluding "fit" or "no fit." Justice Black on national television,
waving his pocket copy of the Constitution, perpetuated the folklore to our day
of "no politics-it's all right here." There is value in recognizing that high court
decisions are the resultant of political choices, good and bad, by different
Supreme Courts, and sometimes even by different members of the same Court
(sometimes 5-4). The Justices know it; constitutional lawyers know it. The media experts know it. One senses that, by now, a good portion of the public
knows it (with a certain embarrassment). Why should not all the public be
taken into our confidence? Especially when publicists such as Attorney General
Meese would celebrate the Bicentennial by dividing the Constitution's history
into two periods: (1) the glorious period of "Framers' intent," from the beginning down to 1954; and (2) post-1954, when the Warren Court started us down
6. R. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 57.
7. 5 (1 Cranch) U.S. 137 (1803).
8. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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the slippery slope of "judicial political activism." In this very connection it is
instructive to examine how it was "in the beginning."
Professor Rotunda has just reviewed for us the relative inertia of the
Supreme Court from 1790, when it first met in New York, to 1801 when Chief
Justice Marshall became the fourth Chief Justice. So I shall start discussion of
the "First Fifty Years" with John Marshall's Court, and continue through the
transition to the early years of Chief Justice Taney. My approach in preparing
this survey has been first to read seriatim the Supreme Court reports down to
1842, and then to supplement this official evidence with the classic accounts of
Charles Warren, 9 Albert Beveridge,10 and Carl Swisher,1 1 and the parallel published volumes of the Holmes Devise.
In a recent article relaunching this Jackson-Cardozo theme of constitutional politics, 12 I focused on some major examples in our early, and our more
recent, history in which political changes were obviously brought about by
Supreme Court decisions, and in which political designs (in the broad sense of
"politics" discussed above) were obvious. Two of these were in the forefront of
the work of the Marshall Court: The doctrine of judicial review from Marbury
(which placed the Supreme Court in a promising, but not yet commanding vantage point), and the flexible national power decisions (at the expense of the
states) that were launched by the Marshall Court in its heyday. These are discussed in the following section. Other developments of constitutional politics
that I stressed in the above article are obviously products of later periods-race,
sex, defendants' rights, voting rights. For there was small concern for rights of
liberty, or due process, or any individual rights other than property, in this first
half century. But this very inattention of the Supreme Court in this early period
was itself the product of the Court's deliberate political choices to attend to
some matters and not to attend to others.
THE MARSHALL YEARS

In view of the large shadow cast by John Marshall over the present day
constitutional law one forgets that the cases before the Court over Marshall's
thirty-four years dealt overwhelmingly with non-constitutional concerns. The
thrust of some of his few constitutional cases had already been curbed before
Marshall departed. The ink was hardly dry on Chief Justice Taney's appointment before three of Marshall's key cases had been blunted, if not turned
around, as foretastes of the Court's new political direction.
The Marshall years (1801-1835) can be plausibly divided into three periods.
In the first, 1801 to 1818, the Court was occupied with its own survival, and
with gradually acquiring considerable respect as a common-law court. The constitutional cases were few. The well-known titan cases-such as Marbury v.
9. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4.
10. IV A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919).
11. C. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1961).
12. Broderick, ConstitutionalPolitics: Affirmative Action and Supreme Process, 16 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 85 (1987).
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Madison,13 Fletcherv. Peck, 14 and Martin v. Hunter'sLessee 1 5-were, of course,
political blockbusters. Beyond these, a review of decided cases in this period
yields few surprises. Perhaps we forget that Marshall gave an early hint in
United States v. Fisher1 6 of McCulloch v. Maryland'S17 boost to implied national
powers. And Justice Jackson remarked1 8 on the Court's adroitness in heeding
public opposition to federal common-law crimes by renouncing them outright in
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin.19
Period two, which constitutes the heyday of Marshall's Court, fairly extends from 1819 through 1828. By 1819 the Court had acquired sufficient selfconfidence to take on state legislatures' claim to amend corporate charters at the
expense of "vested rights,"'20 and to throw the Court's increased prestige behind
the corrupt and unpopular Bank of the United States in the name of implied
federal constitutional powers. 21 If this were not sufficient support for property
rights for one year, the Court also hinted there was a dormant power in the
Constitution's assignment of bankruptcy legislation to Congress, when Congress
22
had not yet acted.
By 1824 Marshall was ready to pronounce expansively on Congress' power
over interstate commerce. This time he was on a popular side-against the
steamboat monopoly-and he cautiously stopped short of pronouncing Congress' power over commerce as exclusive. 2 3 In 1827 the Marshall Court
launched its last bold political strike, this time in support of national control
over foreign commerce and of limiting state taxation of imports until they had
left the "original package" in which they arrived. 24 The hint that the Marshall
political magic was waning came in two other cases in 1827 and 1829. In one
the Court backed away from its earlier suggestion in Sturges v. Crowninshield,
that states are without power over bankruptcies. 25 In the other case Marshall
himself conceded that there was indeed some state power over interstate commerce, and furnished the Court's first suggestion that states had a certain "police
power" which the Constitution did not abrogate even in legislative areas it spe26
cifically assigned to Congress.
Period three-from 1829 to 1835 (when Marshall died)-nmight fairly be
called one of "brake and decline." In 1830 Marshall's views won a minor victory, when the Court held unconstitutional Missouri's issuance of a specie of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

5 (1 Cranch) U.S. 137 (1803).
10 (6 Cranch) U.S. 87 (1810).
14 (1 Wheat.) U.S. 304 (1816).
6 (2 Cranch) U.S. 358 (1805).
17 (4 Wheat.) U.S. 316 (1819).
R. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 31.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 (4 Wheat.) U.S. 518 (1819).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 (4 Wheat.) U.S. 316 (1819).
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 (4 Wheat.) U.S. 122 (1819).
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 (9 Wheat.) U.S. 1 (1824).
Brown v. Maryland, 25 (12 Wheat.) U.S. 419 (1827).

25. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 (12 Wheat.) U.S. 213 (1827).
26. See Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 (2 Pet.) U.S. 245 (1829).
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banknote. 27 But already Jackson appointees were making their presence felt in
dissents. In 1833 Marshall wrote for a unanimous Court that the Bill of Rights
limited only the federal government, and not the states. Opponents of the
Court-except for anti-slavery forces pressing for relief through fifth amendment "due process"-could hardly find fault with such a non-assertive conclusion.28 In three significant cases in this period the Marshall forces could no
longer sustain a majority. However, the Court was so closely divided that a
majority could not be mustered by the opposing side. Two of these cases were
argued in the 1834 Term. One of them, Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 29 concerned small denomination bills issued by the Bank of Kentucky. Marshall,
Story, Duvall, and Johnson seem to have thought the case covered by the Craig
v. Missouri 30 case of 1830 as a "bill of credit." When voting time came Justice
Johnson was absent because of a serious illness, and three Justices opposed the
Marshall triumverate. In the same 1834 Term the Court heard argument in
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 31 which involved a New York statute restricting
access of passengers entering the country from abroad. The same voting alignment prevailed after argument as in Briscoe. Chief Justice Marshall's statement
indicated that a distinctly different Court practice governed constitutional cases
than nonconstitutional cases:
The practice of this Court is not (except in cases of absolute necessity)
to deliver any judgment where constitutional cases are involved, unless
four judges concur in opinion, thus making the decision that of a majority of the whole court. In the present cases [Briscoe and Miln] four
judges do not concur in opinion as to the constitutional questions
which have been argued. The
Court therefore directs these cases to be
32
reargued at the next Term.
Things were still more unsettled at the start of the 1835 Term. Justice
Johnson had died, and President Jackson had appointed Justice Wayne in his
place. Justice Duvall (who had been aligned with the Marshall bloc in the two
cases) had resigned. Marshall announced: "The Court cannot know whether
there will be a full Court during the Term; but as the Court is now composed the
constitutional cases will not be taken up." 33 Marshall died on July 6, 1835, and
the cases were not heard until the 1837 Term, by which time Chief Justice Roger
B. Taney was presiding over the Supreme Court. A third holdover case was
heard with Briscoe and Miln at the 1837 Term. This was the longstanding
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.34 Considered together the three cases
may be considered the "transition trilogy," as they give a graphic picture of the
change of political direction that showed itself at the very outset of the Taney
Court.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Craig v. Missouri, 29 (4 Pet.) U.S. 410 (1830).
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 (7 Pet.) U.S. 243 (1833).
36 (11 Pet.) U.S. 257 (1837).
29 (4 Pet.) U.S. 410 (1830).
36 (11 Pet.) U.S. 102 (1837).
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 118, 122 (1834).
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 85, 85 (1835).
36 (11 Pet.) U.S. 420 (1837).
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TRANSITION TO TANEY

The Charles River Bridge Case had been first argued in 1831, and not decided. At the end of the 1832 Term it was 'again continued. According to
Warren,
It seems that, as the Court stood in 1832, Story, Marshall and Thompson were in favor of reversing the decree of the Massachusetts Court,
McLean was doubtful as to jurisdiction, Baldwin dissented, and Johnson and Duvall had been absent. When the case was finally decided in
1837, seven Judges took the contrary view [there were now nine mem35
bers of the Court], and Story and Thompson dissented.
When the Charles River Bridge Case was first argued, the Marshall-StoryThompson bloc had viewed the case as in line with the Court's earlier "obligation of contract" cases (Fletcherv. Peck, and Dartmouth College v. Woodward).
As decided by the Taney Court, Charles River Bridge left considerably more
latitude to a state legislature to modify ancient grants. The earlier rigor of the
Marshall Court with respect to "vested rights" was softened, but not repudiated.
The Taney Court's decision sustaining the Kentucky law in Briscoe, was an evident departure from Craigv. Missouri of only seven years before. The third 1837
"transition" case, Miln, was a commerce clause case. Again the Taney Court
voted differently than Chief Justice Marshall had in 1834. Story was alone in
dissent. He claimed that the Court's decision repudiated Gibbons v. Ogden since
it renounced Congress' exclusive power over interstate and foreign commerce.
Story's word is not doubted that Marshall had been on the other side when Miln
had been first argued. But Marshall had not opted for congressional exclusivity
over commerce in Gibbons, still less so in Willson v. Blackbird Creek. Still, the
Taney Court in Miln gave a distinct new twist to the state's "police power" in
relation to interstate and foreign commerce that foreshadowed more play in the
joints for the states in the decades ahead.
In this transition trilogy is the plainest evidence of a nation's new politics
being converted into new constitutional law through the vehicle of presidential
appointments to the Court. Warren's commentary on this "constitutional politics" situation as of January 1841 is so much to the point it is almost embarrassing: "[S]o fully had Jackson's appointees on the Court satisfied the country, that
political criticism of its decisions had almost entirely disappeared." 36
FORMS OF POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST

FIFTY

YEARS

At the outset I identified various forms of "politics" that I considered
within the scope of a "politics thesis." What particular forms of politics were
most evident in the first fifty years? Both Charles Warren and Albert Beveridge
stress that partisan (Federalist-Republican or Whig-Democrat) politics did not
reach within the Supreme Court itself, however powerfully partisan politics
pressed on the Court from outside throughout the Marshall years. Beveridge
35. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 233 n.2.
36. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 341.
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makes this point in his biography of Marshall to stress how successfully Marshall, the Hamiltonian Federalist par excellence, had coralled the appointees of
Jefferson and his successors, at least until the period of decline after 1828. Warren is making a more controversial point: that Supreme Court Justices have
never been chargeable with political partisanship.
But neither Warren nor Beveridge challenge the evidence that individual
Justices, and ultimately the Court as a whole, in this first fifty years (as later)
were guided in their constitutional interpretation by their private hierarchy of
political preferences. After the election of Andrew Jackson as president in 1828
the political temper of the country towards a more popular democracy began to
be reflected in new Supreme Court appointments, and in the "transition" (to
Taney) decisions I have just discussed. Prior to this time the two dominant
political themes of John Marshall-the nationalizing "union" theme, and the
ultra-conservative "vested rights" of property theme-had effectively programmed the constitutional choices of the Supreme Court.
Union politics: The price of union in the Convention of 1787 had been
"compromise," and the "compromise" had been at the core the perpetuation of
slavery. But the anti-Union pressures on the Marshall Court had been from the
North as well as the South. Clearly Marshall's program was to strengthen the
national government. This entailed the judicial review power of the Supreme
Court (Marbury), particularly over the states (Hunter'sLessee), perhaps a constitutional handle over state action (the "obligation of contracts" clause in
Dartmouth College), and certainly a flexible doctrine interpreting congressional
power (McCulloch). But by 1830 Marshall was despondent that his efforts had
failed: "The crisis of our Constitution is now upon us," he wrote Story. A few
months later, after reading three dissenting opinions in Craig v. Missouri, he
wrote Story again:
[I]t requires no prophet to predict that the 25th Section [the clause of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 permitting Supreme Court review of state
judgments] is to be... nullified by the Supreme Court of the United
States. I hope the case in which this is to be accomplished will not
occur in
my time, but accomplished it will be at no very distant
37
period.
Economic politics: The Union was saved (for the moment) not by Marshall
(as Beveridge would have us believe), but by President Jackson's strong repudiation of Nullification after his reelection in 1832. But Marshall's second string to
his bow-"vested rights"-was not so fortunate. The "obligation of contract"
decisions had been "economic politics" more than "union politics," and of McCulloch (which upheld the hated Bank of the United States) the same point
could be argued. Beveridge, almost an idolator of Marshall, refers to Marshall's
"unyielding conservatism" and "rock-like conservatism." '38 The turnaround
against Marshall economic conservatism was indicated as early as 1827, in
Ogden v. Saunders, when "[flor the first time in twenty-seven years the majority
37. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 187.
38. See IV A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 10, at 480, 482.
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of the court opposed Marshall on a question of Constitutional law." 39 The die
was finally cast in the "transition" decisions I have discussed, the 1837 trilogy of
the Taney Court.
Slavery politics: Any slavery politics that can be identified in the Supreme
Court in its first fifty years might be called the politics of avoidance. Only by the
end of the fifty-year period did cases involving slavery issues commence to arrive at the Supreme Court. In 1841-42 three such cases were decided. In two of
them the Court (to Warren's great satisfaction) managed to avoid reaching the
slavery issues. In the third, Prigg v. Pennsylvania,4° Justice Story muffled his
avowed anti-slavery voice in deciding that a Pennsylvania law which withheld
local cooperation in returning fugitive slaves was unconstitutional as in conflict
with the exclusive power of Congress over the subject of fugitive slaves. It seems
that here, as elsewhere, Story mirrored Marshall. Beveridge wrote that "Marshall held the opinion on slavery generally prevailing at that time. He was far
more concerned that the Union should be strengthened ...than he was over the
problem of human bondage, of which he saw no solution."'4 1 Making allowances for Marshall's "union at all costs" priority, and the express concessions to slavery made in the text of the Constitution, there is room to fault
Marshall here. His contemporary was Chancellor George Wythe of Virginia, of
whom Justice Powell spoke last night (and writes in this issue). In 1806, Wythe
interpreted Virginia's Bill of Rights: "[F]reedom is the birth-right of every
human being, which sentiment is strongly inculcated by the very first article of
our 'political catechism,' the bill of rights." He was reversed on appeal. 42 Marshall's colleague, Justice William Johnson, a South Carolinian, while sitting on
circuit in Charleston, held unconstitutional a South Carolina statute that required free black seamen debarking in that state to be jailed immediately. Marshall wrote Story:
Our brother Johnson, I perceive, has hung himself on a democratic
snag.... You have, it is said, some laws in Massachusetts, not very
unlike in principles to that which our brother has declared unconstitutional. We have its twin brother in Virginia; a case has been brought
before me in which I might have considered its constitutionality, had I
chosen to do so; but it was not absolutely necessary, and as I am not
fond of butting against a wall in sport, I escaped on the construction of
43
the act.
This example of Marshall's "temperance" (or insensitivity) leads easily to our
next category.
Institutional politics: This label requires some explanation. There is clearly
politics within the Court itself in its internal functioning. The need to secure the
swing vote was as obvious in Marshall's day as in our own. Compare Marshall's
inability to secure that vital vote in the transition trilogy with Justice Black39. IV A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 10, at 481.

40. 41 (16 Pet.) U.S. 539 (1842).
41. IV A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 10, at 479.

42. Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806).
43. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 86.
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mun's recent avowal in his Moyers television interview (April 26, 1987) that
"compromise" is the rule within the Court. But there is another sense of institutional politics-concern with matters outside the Court, concern that the Court
not be disadvantaged as an institution by an improvident judicial intervention
(the notion that Chief Justice Hughes referred to as the Court's "self-inflicted
wounds"). 44 Marshall was ready to risk much for union, to risk a great deal for
property (and "vested rights"), but not much at all for "liberty." Neither Warren nor Beveridge seem to think Marshall tarnished by this judicial "temperand
ance." But authors of our great contemporary historical studies of slavery
45
Small
otherwise.
think
naturally
quite
period
this
the Supreme Court covering
wonder that they question whether Marshall's unanimous decision for the Court
in Barron v. Baltimore that the first eight amendments containing the Bill of
Rights did not limit the states was all that obvious, or necessary. For the due
process clause of the fifth amendment was one rare hope (slender perhaps) for a
constitutional challenge to slavery, the paradigm deprivation of liberty.
THE POLITICS THESIS AND PREVIOUS SPEAKERS

Several of the earlier speakers at this forum furnished a needed contrast to
the limited objective of the politics thesis I have been developing. For the politics thesis has value only as a first step: to make clear the wide range of political
choices the Supreme Court has made in two centuries. The task that remains to
the constitutional law profession was well exemplified here: suggesting to the
Justices (who hold the "office") the varying views of particular individuals
(without "bffice") as to how the Constitution should be interpreted.
For example, Michael Curtis insisted that a more faithful attention by the
Supreme Court to the "framers intent" of the fourteenth amendment would
have spared the nation the long-postponed application of the first eight amendments to the states. This point is carefully developed by him in his excellent
book. 46 However, the conclusiveness of the historical evidence has been continuously disputed-as Mr. Curtis is well aware. More important, without accepting the Curtis version of the "framers history" the Court first rejected and
finally adopted most of the conclusions Mr. Curtis favors. The politics thesis
hardly makes a bold claim in suggesting that both the initial rejection, and the
later partial acceptance, by the Court represented political choices. While the
initial choice of total rejection was unfortunate-in both Mr. Curtis' opinion and
mine-it is difficult to support the position that this would be a better nation if
the Supreme Court had interpreted the fourteenth amendment to require civil
juries (seventh amendment) and indictment only by grand jury (fifth amendment) of the states. This last suggestion is not entailed by the politics thesis,
which is purely descriptive. But it does suggest doubt as to the wisdom of seiz44. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-54 (1928).
45. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975);
W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848

(1977).
46. M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
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ing "framers intent" as the automatic and exclusive paradigm for interpretation
of general constitutional language-even when the historical morsels are
favorable to the conclusion we would reach. In this connection one must deal
with the "framers intent" notion as to "discrimination" on the basis of sex, coming to terms with museum pieces like Bradwell v. Illinois4 7 (a difficult, but not
impossible task).
Senator Biden and Stanley Brand celebrated that most "political" of constitutional doctrines, the separation of powers, or as political flexibilists prefer to
style it, the doctrine of shared powers. By whatever name, both reaffirmed that
the Supreme Court in recent years had thrown its considerable political weight
on the side of rigidity rather than flexibility in this area. In true advocate style,
Biden on behalf of the Senate, and Brand on the parallel side of the House of
Representatives, entered the lists of current controversy on the side of their constituency, the Congress. Even as they did so they highlighted that in this clash
of the behemoths among adversaries (the President and the Congress), resolution of a controversy was often achieved by the contestants themselves without
judicial intervention-often by a pure political standoff. However, the Burger
Court, at least, showed a taste for entering this "thicket," resolving two major
"shared powers" conflicts on the side of rigid separation. 48 Again constitutional
politics, of a particular brand.
The next three speakers, all law professors, exhibited the variety of roles
that the constitutional academy assumes as contributions to constitutional development. Professor Dick Howard presented the Supreme Court's most recent
adventure in "federalism" 49 less as a political choice with which he disagreed
than as an obvious error to be corrected. This role, no less than Biden's and
Brand's, is that of an advocate for one political position within a constitutional
area. Such an advocate may, though he need not, present in support of his position a sample of what has been called "law office history"-"the selection of
data favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for
contradictory data. ' 50 But then so, many times, have the Justices.
A quite different, but no less typical, product of the constitutional academy
was Professor Van Alstyne's study of the varieties of "establishment" that existed at the time of the adoption of the first amendment religion clauses. Bringing such a historical nugget to the attention of the Court may serve as a
corrective of certain "law office history" that buttressed earlier Supreme Court
opinions. In an area of constitutional interpretation where the Court has been
closely divided, such a corrective may give impetus to a political tilt by one or
more Justices-enough to give a new direction to the Court. Or it may have no
effect at all.
Still another style of academic contribution to the development of constitutional law was exhibited by Professor Ronald Rotunda. Selecting two recent
47.
48.
49.
50,

83 (16 Wall.) U.S. 130 (1873).
Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Kelly, Clio and the Court, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 119, 122.
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clusters of Supreme Court cases as exhibits, he decried the lack of coherence and
consistency in some recent products of the Justices.
Professor John Conley cautioned against undue reliance on science and
technology in expectation of passionless-or nonpolitical, if you like-decisionmaking. His warning was "Beware, science is often pseudo, or otherwise
51
wrong." As to "pseudo" he gave testimony on the pitiful saga of Buck v. Bell
in which a Justice as astute as Oliver Wendell Holmes allowed hereditary nonsense to justify state castration of recidivist criminals. His example of "otherwise wrong" was the use of psychological evidence (this time for a5 2"good"
result) in the famous footnote eleven of Brown v. Board of Education.
CONCLUSION:

FROM CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I have been discussing particularly the first fifty years of the Supreme
Court, affirming that the "politics thesis" (in the broad sense of "politics" described here) is verified from the Court's beginning. Recalling Justice Jackson, I
have argued that this was inevitable given the blank page on which the Court
wrote, the open-textured constitutional text, and the Convention's withholding
of legislative history (until the 1840 publication of Madison's Notes). The scene
changes when the Taney Court, after decades of "temperance," moved into the
teeth of the anti-slavery whirlwind. 5 3 It changes again when the post-Civil War
Congress not only tellingly expands the constitutional text (1865-1870), but expands the federal judicial agenda by finally giving the federal courts general jurisdiction over all federal questions (1875). My earlier article dwelt on the
"constitutional politics" of these more modem developments. But, a question
arises. What value is there in stressing that thefact of "constitutional politics" is
established by such self-evident history? Consider the following:
1. The politics thesis serves as a corrective to the double misinformation
disseminated by the Meese-Reynolds Department of Justice:5 4 (1) that "framers
intent," if intelligently pursued, will cure the distorted products of "judicial activism." As already noted, by withholding the legislative history of the 1787
Convention the framers identified their basic intent: to launch a charter sufficiently flexible to house conflicting interpretations in what Marshall would call
"ages to come." (2) that Marshall's claim of the Court's finality in constitutional interpretation, as reaffirmed in more recent days,5 5 created no constitutional law beyond the case at hand. If this were presented as a political position
that Meese-Reynolds would like to establish, this lonely view would be eligible
as a proposal to be fought for. But in view of the general public acceptance of
the Marshall position over 184 years, this Meese-Reynolds contention, made as
a statement of fact, is plain misinformation.
51. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
52. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.11 (1954).
53. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 (19 How.) U.S. 393 (1857).
54. The pertinent Meese Tulane speech of Oct. 21, 1986, and the Reynolds Chicago speech of
Nov. 15, 1986, are quoted and discussed in Broderick, supra note 12, at 146 n.404, 148 n.409.
55. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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2. The "politics thesis" documents how the system has actually operated.
It is only a first step, a preliminary to the vigorous current debate on how the
constitutional system should work. But, as far as it goes, it represents "truth" to
say the Supreme Court has acted "politically" in pronouncing "constitutional
law." The process is constitutional politics; the product is constitutional law. It
has happened this way across two centuries-with results that have been sometimes good, and sometimes horrible.
3. The Supreme Court has recognized from the beginning that there is an
almost generic difference between general law and constitutional law. Again,
the first fifty years supplies the keys: no citations of precedents in Marshall's
major decisions; Marshall's announcement of special ground rules for constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court; the readiness of Taney's Court to depart from recent precedent for political reasons in constitutional cases gave early
indication of the well-recognized weakness of stare decisis as a ground of decision when constitutional issues are at stake. As early as 1833 Justice Story produced his Commentarieson the Constitution of the United States, which sought
to "legalize" the process of constitutional decision-making. Although Marshall
applauded, 56 within four years, as we have seen, Story was relegated to dissent.
And Jackson's appointee, Justice Baldwin, produced his "doctrines" of constitutional decision-making, which confficted with Story at almost every turn. 57
Surely John Marshall's most enduring insight was his McCulloch v. Maryland
suggestion that the framers were not common legislators, but had created a
charter "intended to endure for ages to come."
4. The breadth of possibilities within reach under the Constitution poses
to each Justice, and to each Supreme Court, the question "What kind of country
do I want this to be?" There is little room to hide. Political choices have often
predictable political consequences.
5. As early as these first fifty years we see space for nonjudicial input into
constitutional decision-making: presidential nomination of Justices, senatorial
examination and approval of nominees, congressional control of federal court
jurisdiction, sometimes just plain noisy public dissatisfaction. Still the power of
Justices, once seated, is enormous-for good and for ill. That is the fact-our
system of constitutional politics. We need broader public recognition of this
fact, and perhaps early education as to the citizen's role, or input, with respect to
the Supreme Court. Only when we have assured such public understanding does
the crucial question make sense: Do we wish to change a system that gives such
lifetime power to nine unelected men and women? Proposals for change were
persistent in the first fifty years, and since. Dissatisfaction with the politics of
the Court has been chronic. But to date no agreement has been reached on how
to change the judicial arrangements that were put in place in 1789-which
speaks for a measure of satisfaction as well.
56. 2 C. WARREN, supra note 4, at 239.

57. See H. BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1837).

